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Abstract
This paper discusses customary land governance focusing on the contest for control of customary land 
between the state and traditional authorities. Governance of land is one of the most complex issues in 
Africa. The complexity of this issue can be attributed to the dual land tenure system; statutory and 
customary tenure. Although the two tenure systems have co-existed for over a century now, there are 
several challenges which this duality creates when it comes to the administration and governance of
land. Drawing mainly from the Zambian case study, the paper argues that although the state, as a 
sovereign entity, has the right to regulate the governance and administration of land under its territory, 
the situation is complicated by the fact that traditional authorities also claim ownership (allodial rights) 
over customary land. This seemingly overlapping claim to customary land leads to contestation, with 
the state appealing to its sovereign authority while the traditional leaders appeal to culture, history, 
tradition, and sometimes ‘soft politics’. In some cases, the contest over customary land, sometimes result 
into an open contestation between the state and traditional leaders, as the Zambia case presented in this 
paper illustrates.
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discussion of how the different types of land in Zambia are administered. This is followed by an analysis 
of the current tension between the state and traditional authorities over the control and administration of 
customary land. The last section concluded the discussion. 
2.  Land governance in Africa
Land governance can be understood in simple terms as the rules and policies which regulate the exercise 
of power and control over land. What is entailed in land governance is not so much the day to day 
dynamics of accessing and using land; it is about the rules which regulate the practices around land 
ownership, allocation, access and use. In this sense, land governance involves general rules and 
arrangements (institutions), formal or informal, through which the control or authority over land is 
mediated and exercised. Fundamentally, land governance is about how power relations around land are 
configured between the different key land actors at different levels. It is important to emphasise here 
that the structures and rules which guide and regulate the activities of land administrators are not cast in 
stones; they are negotiated and contested by the different actors who often stake their claims to 
reconfigure the power relations around land. Lund (1998:2) has rightly described the dynamics around 
land governance in Africa when he observes that the structures and rules through which land is governed 
are ‘not enduring absolutes, but rather outcomes of negotiations, contestation, compromise and deal 
making—characterised by the condition he refers to as ‘open moment.’ This (open moment) occurs 
‘when the social rules and structures are suddenly challenged and the prerogatives and legitimacy of 
politico-legal institutions ceases to be taken for granted’ (ibid). For example, in the case of Zambia, the 
prerogative of traditional leaders over customary land is challenged by the state’s decision to create 
statutory bodies to administer customary land. On the other hand, traditional authorities’ rejection of this 
decision indicates that the state’s power over customary land should not be taken as a given. In what 
way that the contest will be resolved, it will be a result of negotiation and deal making, rather than one 
party unilaterally asserting its power. 
2.1.  Land governance framework
It is also important here to make a distinction between land governance and land administration, noting 
that the latter is a part of the former. Land governance as noted earlier provides the meta-framework 
through which land is administered. Land administration on the other hand relates to the day to day 
management of issues related to allocation, validation of ownership, application of the rules, resolution 
of disputes, keeping of records or any form of evidence etc. In other words, land governance is a broader 
concept which provides the rules and structures to regulate institutions and mechanisms of decision-
making concerning the administration of land. Many African countries have outlined policies and legal 
frameworks to provide guidance on the exercise of power over land and the institutions involved in the 
administration of the day to day affairs of land resources (see AU/AfDB/UNECA 2010). In addition to 
the general legal and policy framework, there are also specific rules and guidelines which regulate the 
exercise of power over specific types of land. For example, there are different rules and legislation 
regarding customary land compared to land under a game reserve or nature conservation. These rules 
1.  Introduction
Land is one of the most basic natural resources in any country. Most human activities take place on land, 
and many other valuable natural resources are located on land. But the importance of land goes beyond 
the value of being the abode of most natural resources and a means of production; land also defines and 
demarcates polities, confers and shapes identities of people, communities, nations and regions. As the 
first Zambian Draft Land Policy (GRZ 2006:2) observes, ‘Land is the most fundamental resource in any 
society because it is the basis of human survival.’ Given the centrality of land in human activities, the 
governance and administration of land are at the centre of human interactions in society. In Africa the 
governance of land is even more critical because of the intricate embeddedness of land relations in 
society as well as the fact that majority of the people directly rely on land as a livelihood source. The 
governance of this important resource in Africa is further complicated by the presence of two separate 
land tenure systems which, though have co-existed for over a century now, present several challenges 
when it comes to the administration of land.
This paper looks at one of the land governance challenges arising from the existence of a dual or 
multiple land tenure systems, focusing on customary land. The paper has discussed the land governance 
challenges prevalent in many African countries as a result of the state and customary authorities 
asserting their right to control and administer customary land. This situation often leads to a contest 
between the two contending entities; which sometimes burst into an open contest as the Zambian case 
discussed below show. Focus in this paper is not on the contest around access to land resources, but 
about the rules which govern and regulate access to land. It is argued in this paper that as the demand 
for land increases in many African countries due to several factors including rising population, 
urbanisation, economic growth and environmental dynamics, the contest for the control of customary 
land between the state and customary authorities is likely to intensify.  
The paper draws mainly from the current contest between the Zambian government and traditional 
authorities over who should be ‘in-charge’ of customary land. In this particular case, although the 
Zambian state, as a sovereign entity, has the right to regulate the governance and administration of all
land (including customary land) under its territory, the situation is much more complicated by the fact 
that traditional authorities also claim primary ownership (allodial rights) of customary land. The paper 
shows that the state’s command over customary land is held in check by traditional leaders’ influence 
and appeal to soft power, particularly when it comes to the rural vote. Due to the strong influence 
traditional leaders have in rural areas even today, most African states tread carefully when it comes to 
asserting their sovereign right over customary land. As the Zambian case clearly shows, while traditional 
authorities are not challenging the sovereignty of the state; they are contesting the way the meaning and 
practical implication of state power.  
1.1.  Outline
The paper is organised in five sections. The next section provides an overview of land governance issues 
in Africa, focusing on customary land. This is followed by a profile of the land resources in Zambia and 
how the land resource is divided up into different categories of land. Following this section is a 
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traditional leaders have in rural areas even today, most African states tread carefully when it comes to 
asserting their sovereign right over customary land. As the Zambian case clearly shows, while traditional 
authorities are not challenging the sovereignty of the state; they are contesting the way the meaning and 
practical implication of state power.  
1.1.  Outline
The paper is organised in five sections. The next section provides an overview of land governance issues 
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is prominently featuring in major policy debates in many countries, sometimes leading to struggles and 
contestations (Moyo 2008). As Nuesiri (2014:7) observes, the  
Struggles for control over and access to nature and natural resources; struggles over land, 
forests, pastures and fisheries are struggles for survival, self-determination, and meaning. 
Natural resources are central to rural lives and livelihoods; they provide the material 
resources for survival, security and freedom.  
It is therefore not surprising that when African states try to change the rules of the game surrounding 
governance of natural resources, local communities through their leaders, are challenging and contesting 
these changes, especially if there are attempt to take away the control over natural resources from local 
communities. Thus while governance of state land is clear and less contested, the governance of 
customary land is increasingly contested, especially if the state attempts to assert its ultimate authority 
to control customary land.  
2.3.  Land and the notion of statehood 
The contestation between the state and traditional leaders has been sparked by the government’s decision 
to change existing structures and rules governing customary land. As illustrated in the case of Zambia, 
traditional authorities are challenging the state’s move to take away the land administration powers of 
traditional leaders by creating and delegating administrative powers to formal structures such as the 
District Land Board and Customary Land Committees (see GRZ 2015:31). It is these institutional 
reforms outlined in the new Draft Land Policy which have awakened traditional leaders who have 
realised that their interest and powers to administer customary land is being undermined, and they have 
decided to challenge and contest these changes to exiting rules. In contesting the proposed changes to 
the current institutional and administrative arrangement, traditional leaders have argued that the new 
Draft Land Policy does not take their interest into account. They argue that the new Draft Land Policy
does not even mention the name chiefs, which they interpret as an effective removal of traditional leaders 
from the administration of customary land (Kapata 2018). In this particular case, the contest over land 
resources is not directly about issues of access to land; it is about the rules and structures which govern 
the day to day administration of land in customary areas. Although the state, as a sovereign entity, 
assumes the ultimate authority over all land in Zambia, the exercise of its powers over customary land 
can be challenged by other actors such as traditional leaders. It is important to note that what is being 
contested is not the territorial authority (sovereignty), but the rules which govern the exercise of power 
and control over customary land.  
Some analysts have attributed the contestation over and claim to customary land by traditional 
authorities to the weakness of states in Africa. The fact that traditional leaders contest for the control of 
customary land has sometimes been interpreted as evidence of fragmentation of the state (Jackson and 
Robserg 1982, Jackson 1990). For instance, it has been argued that traditional leaders are able to assert 
their authority over land primarily because African states are unable to project their authority over the 
(both formal and informal) outlines who has the power to make and take certain decisions and carryout 
particular administrative functions relating to land. As such, land governance, everywhere is not just 
about land, it is fundamentally about the exercise of power over land—the politics of land (see Lund 
and Boone 2013). Since governance of land is about the exercise of power over land, it constitute the 
core of land politics, as different actors and stakeholders contest for stakes in land. 
2.2.  An anatomy of land governance in Africa
In Africa, the allocation of power over land, though a prerogative of the state, has been contested by 
various stakeholders, especially traditional leaders who often see themselves as custodians of customary 
land which they hold in trust on behalf of the local people. Traditional leaders’ claim to land is based on 
social, cultural and historical ties to land (Okoth-Ogendo 1989). Unlike the modern African state whose 
power over land is rooted in the formal processes of political legitimacy and sovereignty, the traditional 
leaders’ claim of power over land is deeply embedded in the social relations which link the past, present 
and future to the here and now (ibid). Thus, when traditional leaders are laying claim to or contesting 
rules and structures around land, they are relying not on the constitution or any other formal processes 
of establishing legitimacy such as statutory law, but on the social practice and cultural norms through 
which land has been governed and shared over centuries. Thus, customary land in Africa is an arena 
where there is a confluence of two different types claims, with different sources of legitimacy.
While the state has the backing of formal processes of the law and political legitimation, traditional 
leaders have the backing of cultural beliefs, traditional values, lineage ties and customary norms. In 
many rural communities in Africa, traditional leaders’ control over land is believed to be more popular 
and stronger than the state’s claim. This is evident in the fact that many rural residents still believe that 
customary land belongs to the ethnic groups, and that the chiefs and the village heads are the custodians 
of the land, wielding the power not only to allocate, but also to interpret and adjust traditional practices 
and norms around land (Blocher 2006).
In most African countries, the state has not intruded much into the governance of customary land, 
with most states granting a large margin of autonomy to traditional authorities to govern and administer 
customary land (Bruce 1982, Shipton and Goheen 1992, Lund 1998). But in recent years as the demand 
for land grows due to mainly population growth, sustained economic growth, environmental factors and 
urbanisation, we are seeing a growing trend towards the reform of customary land policy and governance 
structures being introduced by many African states. Traditional leaders perceive these reforms as a threat 
not only to their power base, but also their existence, given that the institution of traditional leaders 
derive their power and authority from being able to control and allocate land(Lund 2006, Kabilika 2010). 
Though the example from Zambia presented in this paper is not representative of what is happening in 
other African countries, the question around the governance of customary land, which still constitute 
the bulk of the land in Africa (see AU/AfDB/UNECA 2010), is featuring more prominently in land 
policies across the continent, sometimes raising contentious issues around how to harmonise traditional 
structures with modern state institutions and functions (UNECA 2007). Land being a key natural 
resource which is central to the survival of many people in Africa, it is not surprising that its governance 
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of African states alienating the traditional institutions and systems of governance (UNECA 2007, 
Nuesiri 2014). The governance of customary land is a complicated matter that cannot be resolved by the 
show of ‘hard’ power by the state through the threat of violence. The governance of customary land in 
particular is intricately based on the ‘soft’ power which traditional leaders exercise as the Zambian case 
illustrates. 
3.  Land in Zambia
Zambia has a total land mass of 752 000 Km2. Official figures from the Ministry of land say that of this, 
94 percent of the land is under customary tenure, with state land constituting only 6 percent. But this 
has been challenged by a number of analysts who argue that the actual land under the control of 
traditional authorities is much smaller than what the official stats show (see PCAL 2009, Chitonge 2015, 
Sitko et al. 2015, Honig and Mulenga 2015, Mulolwa 2016). While the land effectively under the control 
of traditional leaders has been declining, customary land still constitutes a large portion of land in 
Zambia as table 1 below show. Although land in Zambia is broadly classified into two types of tenure 
(State and customary land), there are effectively three categories of land which are administered by 
different entities (Table 1).  
Table 1. Categories of Land in Zambia 
Source:Author based on data from (Honig and Mulenga 2015, Mulolwa 2016) 
3.1.  State land
This is largely land under leasehold tenure. This category of land is administered and controlled by the 
Commissioner of Lands through the issuance of four types of leases to private individuals, companies 
and trusts. The four leases are a) Ten year land record card, b) 14 year lease for un-surveyed land, c) 30 
Year occupancy license (usually issued in housing improvement areas in peri-urban settlement) and d) 
99 year lease. Current estimates suggest that this category of land accounts for about 16.5 percent of the 
total land mass and not the 6 percent which is often cited in official documents (see GRZ 2006).
3.2.  Public land
This category of land constitute various pieces of land reserved for specific use including nature 
conservation, forests reserves, game reserves, wetlands, mountain range and head water (GRZ 2015:22). 
Land falling under this category is administered by specific statutory bodies such as the Zambia Wildlife 
Authorities (ZAWA). This category of land accounts for close to 40 percent of the total land mass (8 
percent under national parks, 22 percent under game management areas, and 9 percent under forest 
reserve areas, see GRZ 2015:16). While some of the pieces of land under this category fall in customary 
areas, they are effectively not under the control of customary leaders; the lands are controlled by specific 
Customary Public State Total 
Size (Ha) 40 516 000 28 155 100 6 629 248 75 300 348
Percent 53.8 37.4 8.8 100 
entire territory, especially the far flung rural areas, thereby creating a vacuum which is filed by 
traditional leaders who compete with the state (Herbst 2000). It has thus been argued that traditional 
leaders ‘are often competitors to the centralised African state and are viewed as such by national leaders. 
The loyalties that citizens have towards these leaders, often expressed in a complex network of ethnic 
relations, is a significant challenge to African countries still having great difficulty… in creating a 
national ethos’ (ibid:172). Some analysts see dominance of traditional leaders in rural areas as an 
indication of the inability of African states to exercise a monopoly of power over their territories; the 
failure to centralise power and hegemony (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). The existence of traditional 
leaders is interpreted as a competing power base which in the dominant theory of the state and nation-
building is seen as a sign of weakness. This is clearly articulated in Tilly’s (1990) notion of state 
formation as a process of conquering and subjugating competing entities in a specified territory. Drawing 
mainly from the European experience, the idea that the state should have no rivals in its territory is 
captured in the aphorism, ‘war makes states’ (Tilly 1985:170), emphasising the point that states are made 
by conquering all the rival entities in a territory to create a monopoly of power. 
In this understanding of statehood, the presence of anything that appears to be a rival or a form of 
competition to the state is assumed to be a clear sign that the formation of the state is incomplete or 
weak. Tilly (1985) for instance, argues that, ‘the people who controlled European states and states in the 
making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus to enjoy the advantages of 
power with a secure or expanding territory’ (1985:171). In the case of Africa, the traditional leaders’ 
claim to control over land can then be seen as a form of competition to the state. According to this view, 
a properly formed state should have ultimate authority and control over land under its territory. The fact 
that traditional leaders contest the control over customary land in this paradigm of statehood can be 
constituted as a sign of weakness of the state. But this is a simplistic understanding to this complex array 
of issues.  
Tilly’s model of statehood which is built on the idea that war makes states is only relevant to 17th 
Century Europe (see Herbst 2000). The process of state formation today is much more complex than 
merely subjugating weaker entities in the territory through the monopoly of violence. In modern 
democracies, violence is not a legitimating tool for governments. Use of violence to silence opposition 
is seen as sign of weakness, and a huge democratic deficit. In fact many African states tried using the 
monopoly of violence as a tool for creating political legitimacy through one-party states and in some 
cases military rule, that precluded competitive politics which started in the early 1990s (Young 2004). 
The repressive nature of most of the African governments during the 1980s came close to the ideal of 
not tolerating competing power bases, but these states had little legitimacy, and their statehood were 
widely questioned (Stark 1986).  
The control over customary land which most traditional leader in Africa contest is less likely to be 
resolved by a show of force from the state, primarily because traditional leaders are not basing their 
contest on force; they are contesting on their ability to garner soft power—the appeal to cultural beliefs, 
traditions and ethnic solidarity. This is not an issue which can be resolved through the state asserting its 
monopoly of violence. On the contrary, the strength of traditional leaders in rural areas is more a result 
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particular is intricately based on the ‘soft’ power which traditional leaders exercise as the Zambian case 
illustrates. 
3.  Land in Zambia
Zambia has a total land mass of 752 000 Km2. Official figures from the Ministry of land say that of this, 
94 percent of the land is under customary tenure, with state land constituting only 6 percent. But this 
has been challenged by a number of analysts who argue that the actual land under the control of 
traditional authorities is much smaller than what the official stats show (see PCAL 2009, Chitonge 2015, 
Sitko et al. 2015, Honig and Mulenga 2015, Mulolwa 2016). While the land effectively under the control 
of traditional leaders has been declining, customary land still constitutes a large portion of land in 
Zambia as table 1 below show. Although land in Zambia is broadly classified into two types of tenure 
(State and customary land), there are effectively three categories of land which are administered by 
different entities (Table 1).  
Table 1. Categories of Land in Zambia 
Source:Author based on data from (Honig and Mulenga 2015, Mulolwa 2016) 
3.1.  State land
This is largely land under leasehold tenure. This category of land is administered and controlled by the 
Commissioner of Lands through the issuance of four types of leases to private individuals, companies 
and trusts. The four leases are a) Ten year land record card, b) 14 year lease for un-surveyed land, c) 30 
Year occupancy license (usually issued in housing improvement areas in peri-urban settlement) and d) 
99 year lease. Current estimates suggest that this category of land accounts for about 16.5 percent of the 
total land mass and not the 6 percent which is often cited in official documents (see GRZ 2006).
3.2.  Public land
This category of land constitute various pieces of land reserved for specific use including nature 
conservation, forests reserves, game reserves, wetlands, mountain range and head water (GRZ 2015:22). 
Land falling under this category is administered by specific statutory bodies such as the Zambia Wildlife 
Authorities (ZAWA). This category of land accounts for close to 40 percent of the total land mass (8 
percent under national parks, 22 percent under game management areas, and 9 percent under forest 
reserve areas, see GRZ 2015:16). While some of the pieces of land under this category fall in customary 
areas, they are effectively not under the control of customary leaders; the lands are controlled by specific 
Customary Public State Total 
Size (Ha) 40 516 000 28 155 100 6 629 248 75 300 348
Percent 53.8 37.4 8.8 100 
entire territory, especially the far flung rural areas, thereby creating a vacuum which is filed by 
traditional leaders who compete with the state (Herbst 2000). It has thus been argued that traditional 
leaders ‘are often competitors to the centralised African state and are viewed as such by national leaders. 
The loyalties that citizens have towards these leaders, often expressed in a complex network of ethnic 
relations, is a significant challenge to African countries still having great difficulty… in creating a 
national ethos’ (ibid:172). Some analysts see dominance of traditional leaders in rural areas as an 
indication of the inability of African states to exercise a monopoly of power over their territories; the 
failure to centralise power and hegemony (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). The existence of traditional 
leaders is interpreted as a competing power base which in the dominant theory of the state and nation-
building is seen as a sign of weakness. This is clearly articulated in Tilly’s (1990) notion of state 
formation as a process of conquering and subjugating competing entities in a specified territory. Drawing 
mainly from the European experience, the idea that the state should have no rivals in its territory is 
captured in the aphorism, ‘war makes states’ (Tilly 1985:170), emphasising the point that states are made 
by conquering all the rival entities in a territory to create a monopoly of power. 
In this understanding of statehood, the presence of anything that appears to be a rival or a form of 
competition to the state is assumed to be a clear sign that the formation of the state is incomplete or 
weak. Tilly (1985) for instance, argues that, ‘the people who controlled European states and states in the 
making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus to enjoy the advantages of 
power with a secure or expanding territory’ (1985:171). In the case of Africa, the traditional leaders’ 
claim to control over land can then be seen as a form of competition to the state. According to this view, 
a properly formed state should have ultimate authority and control over land under its territory. The fact 
that traditional leaders contest the control over customary land in this paradigm of statehood can be 
constituted as a sign of weakness of the state. But this is a simplistic understanding to this complex array 
of issues.  
Tilly’s model of statehood which is built on the idea that war makes states is only relevant to 17th 
Century Europe (see Herbst 2000). The process of state formation today is much more complex than 
merely subjugating weaker entities in the territory through the monopoly of violence. In modern 
democracies, violence is not a legitimating tool for governments. Use of violence to silence opposition 
is seen as sign of weakness, and a huge democratic deficit. In fact many African states tried using the 
monopoly of violence as a tool for creating political legitimacy through one-party states and in some 
cases military rule, that precluded competitive politics which started in the early 1990s (Young 2004). 
The repressive nature of most of the African governments during the 1980s came close to the ideal of 
not tolerating competing power bases, but these states had little legitimacy, and their statehood were 
widely questioned (Stark 1986).  
The control over customary land which most traditional leader in Africa contest is less likely to be 
resolved by a show of force from the state, primarily because traditional leaders are not basing their 
contest on force; they are contesting on their ability to garner soft power—the appeal to cultural beliefs, 
traditions and ethnic solidarity. This is not an issue which can be resolved through the state asserting its 
monopoly of violence. On the contrary, the strength of traditional leaders in rural areas is more a result 
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effect in 1995. Even if we take a conservative estimate that 8.6 percent of total land had been converted 
from customary land by 2012 (see Sitko et al. 2015:17), it is apparent that the land effectively under the 
control of traditional leaders is much less than the 94 percent which is widely cited. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the ‘discovery of mineral resources practically terminates customary control and creates 
large spheres of state control on customary domain’ (GRZ 2015:16).  
Analysis of the trends in land dynamics in Zambia show that the share of land effectively controlled 
by customary leaders is declining rapidly, especially in the last two decades, due to the process of 
converting customary land to leasehold tenure(see Chitonge et al. 2017, PCAL 2009, Sitko et al. 2015). 
A report by the Parliamentary Committee on Land captures the situation of land that is effectively under 
the control of traditional leaders more succinctly, 
After accounting for state lands, commercial farms, wetlands, game management areas, 
national parks, and the proposed farm block schemes, it becomes clear that the potential 
for expansion of customary farm land is not as great as commonly perceived. In addition, 
leasehold lad has continued to increase in size (owing to the conversion of customary land 
to leasehold tenure), that leaves only an estimated 37 percent as customary land controlled 
by traditional leaders (PCAL 2009:12). 
The New Draft Land Policy also acknowledges that customary land is increasingly coming under 
pressure from growing demand for urbanisation, investment and the growing national population (GRZ 
2015). The creation of Farm Blocks has also take away almost 1 million hectares from customary land 
(Table 3).
statutory bodies (Honig and Mulenga 2015). Land under forest and national parks, particularly, are 
tightly regulated by the delegated state agents who do not allow settlement in these areas. It is only land 
under game management Authorities falling in customary areas where some form of settlement may be 
permitted (ibid). Official figures suggest that land under game management areas covers about one-third 
of the total land under customary areas (GRZ 2015).  
3.3.  Customary land
This is the category of land is under the administration of traditional leaders. If we look at these three 
categories of land, it is apparent that customary leaders effectively control much less land than the 
publicly cited figure of 94 percent. If we take the statement in the New Draft Land Policy that public 
land includes all pieces of land in customary areas which are ‘not allocated exclusively to any group, 
individual or family’ (GRZ 2015: 22), it becomes obvious that customary leaders control less than half 
of the land, although the official category of the land may still be customary land (Table 2). 
Table 2. Land Categories in Zambia by Size (2015)
Source: Author based on (GRZ 2015, Mulolwa 2016, and Honig and Mulenga 2015). 
*GMA= Game Management Areas. There is overlap in land jurisdiction because one piece of land can 
be under game management, forest and national parks. 
Figures in Table 2 above do not include the land which has been converted from customary to leasehold 
tenure by private individuals since the policy to convert customary land to leasehold tenure came into 
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effect in 1995. Even if we take a conservative estimate that 8.6 percent of total land had been converted 
from customary land by 2012 (see Sitko et al. 2015:17), it is apparent that the land effectively under the 
control of traditional leaders is much less than the 94 percent which is widely cited. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the ‘discovery of mineral resources practically terminates customary control and creates 
large spheres of state control on customary domain’ (GRZ 2015:16).  
Analysis of the trends in land dynamics in Zambia show that the share of land effectively controlled 
by customary leaders is declining rapidly, especially in the last two decades, due to the process of 
converting customary land to leasehold tenure(see Chitonge et al. 2017, PCAL 2009, Sitko et al. 2015). 
A report by the Parliamentary Committee on Land captures the situation of land that is effectively under 
the control of traditional leaders more succinctly, 
After accounting for state lands, commercial farms, wetlands, game management areas, 
national parks, and the proposed farm block schemes, it becomes clear that the potential 
for expansion of customary farm land is not as great as commonly perceived. In addition, 
leasehold lad has continued to increase in size (owing to the conversion of customary land 
to leasehold tenure), that leaves only an estimated 37 percent as customary land controlled 
by traditional leaders (PCAL 2009:12). 
The New Draft Land Policy also acknowledges that customary land is increasingly coming under 
pressure from growing demand for urbanisation, investment and the growing national population (GRZ 
2015). The creation of Farm Blocks has also take away almost 1 million hectares from customary land 
(Table 3).
statutory bodies (Honig and Mulenga 2015). Land under forest and national parks, particularly, are 
tightly regulated by the delegated state agents who do not allow settlement in these areas. It is only land 
under game management Authorities falling in customary areas where some form of settlement may be 
permitted (ibid). Official figures suggest that land under game management areas covers about one-third 
of the total land under customary areas (GRZ 2015).  
3.3.  Customary land
This is the category of land is under the administration of traditional leaders. If we look at these three 
categories of land, it is apparent that customary leaders effectively control much less land than the 
publicly cited figure of 94 percent. If we take the statement in the New Draft Land Policy that public 
land includes all pieces of land in customary areas which are ‘not allocated exclusively to any group, 
individual or family’ (GRZ 2015: 22), it becomes obvious that customary leaders control less than half 
of the land, although the official category of the land may still be customary land (Table 2). 
Table 2. Land Categories in Zambia by Size (2015)
Source: Author based on (GRZ 2015, Mulolwa 2016, and Honig and Mulenga 2015). 
*GMA= Game Management Areas. There is overlap in land jurisdiction because one piece of land can 
be under game management, forest and national parks. 
Figures in Table 2 above do not include the land which has been converted from customary to leasehold 
tenure by private individuals since the policy to convert customary land to leasehold tenure came into 
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there have been significant changes to the rules and structures governing land in Zambia after 
independence, the dual system has continued, with what used to be crown land now being administered 
by the Commissioner of Lands, while what used to be reserve and trust1 lands being administered by 
traditional leaders, through customary ‘living law.’ Thus, traditional leaders have been administering 
customary land from the time of first settlement of African communities. Most African states have 
always recognised and accepted this fact, including the role of traditional leaders when it comes to 
customary land. Not only that, but the two important laws in the country, with regard to land (the 
Constitution and the 1995 Lands Act), have both recognised customary and the institution of traditional 
leaders. For example, Section 165 of the Constitutions asserts that, ‘The institution of chieftaincy and 
traditional institutions are guaranteed and shall exist in accordance with the culture, customs and 
traditions of the people to whom they apply.’ Similarly, Section 254 has clearly recognised the existence 
of customary land stating that ‘Land shall be delimited and classified as State land, customary land and 
such other classification, as prescribed.’ 
With specific to land administration, the Lands Act No 29 of 1995 (1995 Lands Act) also recognises 
both customary land and the administrative role of traditional leaders. Section 7(1) of the 1995 Lands 
Act stipulates that,
  
every piece of land in a customary area which immediately before the commencement of 
this Act was vested in or held by any person under customary tenure shall continue to be 
so held and recognised and any provision of this Act or any other law shall not be so 
construed as to infringe any customary right enjoyed by that person before the 
commencement of this Act.
Section 8(2) and (3) clearly allocates a central role to traditional leaders (chiefs) in the administration of 
customary land. These two sections make it clear that traditional leaders have a strong say in what 
happens to customary land. The recognition and role of traditional leaders when it comes to customary 
land is further reinforced in Section 4, which states that the, ‘the President shall not alienate any land 
situated in a district or an area where land is held under customary tenure… without consulting the Chief 
… in the area in which the land to be alienated is situated.’ 
In terms of legal rules, there is sufficient recognition of traditional leaders and their role in the 
administration of land. However, there are contestations around the interpretations of these statutes as 
one would expect. As noted above, it is the interpretations of the rules which create an ‘open moment’ 
where contending parties challenge the dominant interpretations, and offer alternatives. 
                                                   
1 Reserve land was specifically meant for use of indigenous people. Trust land was a category of ‘unclassified 
land’ called silent land and was meant to be allocated to the anticipated large inflows of European migrants after 
the Second World War. When the anticipated influx of Europeans did not occur, silent land was released for use by 
indigenous people. Reserve and Trust lands together constitute what is referred to as a customary land. 
Table 3. Name, Size and Location of Farm Blocks in Zambia 
Name Size '000 Ha District Province Status
Kalumwange 100 Kaoma Western Proposal 
Luena FB 100 Kawambwa Luapula Proposal 
Manshya 147 Mpika Nothrern Proposal 
Mikelenge 100 Solwezi Noth-
Western
Proposal  
Mungu 65 Kafue Lusaka Proposal 
Musakashi 100 Mufulira Copperbelt Exploration 
Mwase-
Phangwe 
100 Lundazi Eastern Proposal  
Nansanga 100 Serenje Central Exploration 
Senanga Citri 1.2 Senanga Western Proposal 
Simango 100 Livingstone Southern Proposal 
Total 913.2 
Source: Zambia Development Agency (2011).
Note: The different documents come up with different names and sizes of the 
proposed farm blocks. The figures here are taken from the most recent report. 
As the land effectively under customary authorities dwindle, traditional leaders are aware that this is 
effectively usurping their powers, and they are contesting this through various avenues.
3.4.  Land governance in Zambia 
Zambia, like many other African countries, since the introduction of colonial rule, has a dual land tenure 
system: customary and statutory land tenure. In pre-colonial times, land was governed through the 
customary land systems which varied according to the local cultural norms and practices. Although the 
practices around land varied from community to community, one of the common elements of customary 
tenure system was that land governance was based on the customary norms, practices and values. In this 
governance system, traditional leaders played a central role, though they were not regarded as owners 
of the land-land belonged to the community as a collective (Bruce 1982). The primary responsibility of 
those who were vested with the power to administer land was to ensure access to land for all members 
of the community. The introduction of statutory tenure saw land in the then Northern Rhodesia, through 
the Northern Rhodesia (Crown and Native Lands Order in Council 1928-1963) divided into two 
categories: crown land which was administered through British common law statutes, and reserve land
which was administered through customary norms and practices (see Bruce 1982). Accordingly, two 
different sets of institutions were established and assigned to administer the two categories of land. 
In terms of land governance as defined above, the colonial government still provided the broader 
framework which regulated the control over reserve land, although the colonial government allowed 
traditional leader to administer land according to the local land norms and cultural practices. Although 
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there have been significant changes to the rules and structures governing land in Zambia after 
independence, the dual system has continued, with what used to be crown land now being administered 
by the Commissioner of Lands, while what used to be reserve and trust1 lands being administered by 
traditional leaders, through customary ‘living law.’ Thus, traditional leaders have been administering 
customary land from the time of first settlement of African communities. Most African states have 
always recognised and accepted this fact, including the role of traditional leaders when it comes to 
customary land. Not only that, but the two important laws in the country, with regard to land (the 
Constitution and the 1995 Lands Act), have both recognised customary and the institution of traditional 
leaders. For example, Section 165 of the Constitutions asserts that, ‘The institution of chieftaincy and 
traditional institutions are guaranteed and shall exist in accordance with the culture, customs and 
traditions of the people to whom they apply.’ Similarly, Section 254 has clearly recognised the existence 
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With specific to land administration, the Lands Act No 29 of 1995 (1995 Lands Act) also recognises 
both customary land and the administrative role of traditional leaders. Section 7(1) of the 1995 Lands 
Act stipulates that,
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this Act was vested in or held by any person under customary tenure shall continue to be 
so held and recognised and any provision of this Act or any other law shall not be so 
construed as to infringe any customary right enjoyed by that person before the 
commencement of this Act.
Section 8(2) and (3) clearly allocates a central role to traditional leaders (chiefs) in the administration of 
customary land. These two sections make it clear that traditional leaders have a strong say in what 
happens to customary land. The recognition and role of traditional leaders when it comes to customary 
land is further reinforced in Section 4, which states that the, ‘the President shall not alienate any land 
situated in a district or an area where land is held under customary tenure… without consulting the Chief 
… in the area in which the land to be alienated is situated.’ 
In terms of legal rules, there is sufficient recognition of traditional leaders and their role in the 
administration of land. However, there are contestations around the interpretations of these statutes as 
one would expect. As noted above, it is the interpretations of the rules which create an ‘open moment’ 
where contending parties challenge the dominant interpretations, and offer alternatives. 
                                                   
1 Reserve land was specifically meant for use of indigenous people. Trust land was a category of ‘unclassified 
land’ called silent land and was meant to be allocated to the anticipated large inflows of European migrants after 
the Second World War. When the anticipated influx of Europeans did not occur, silent land was released for use by 
indigenous people. Reserve and Trust lands together constitute what is referred to as a customary land. 
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Mikelenge 100 Solwezi Noth-
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Mwase-
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100 Lundazi Eastern Proposal  
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Simango 100 Livingstone Southern Proposal 
Total 913.2 
Source: Zambia Development Agency (2011).
Note: The different documents come up with different names and sizes of the 
proposed farm blocks. The figures here are taken from the most recent report. 
As the land effectively under customary authorities dwindle, traditional leaders are aware that this is 
effectively usurping their powers, and they are contesting this through various avenues.
3.4.  Land governance in Zambia 
Zambia, like many other African countries, since the introduction of colonial rule, has a dual land tenure 
system: customary and statutory land tenure. In pre-colonial times, land was governed through the 
customary land systems which varied according to the local cultural norms and practices. Although the 
practices around land varied from community to community, one of the common elements of customary 
tenure system was that land governance was based on the customary norms, practices and values. In this 
governance system, traditional leaders played a central role, though they were not regarded as owners 
of the land-land belonged to the community as a collective (Bruce 1982). The primary responsibility of 
those who were vested with the power to administer land was to ensure access to land for all members 
of the community. The introduction of statutory tenure saw land in the then Northern Rhodesia, through 
the Northern Rhodesia (Crown and Native Lands Order in Council 1928-1963) divided into two 
categories: crown land which was administered through British common law statutes, and reserve land
which was administered through customary norms and practices (see Bruce 1982). Accordingly, two 
different sets of institutions were established and assigned to administer the two categories of land. 
In terms of land governance as defined above, the colonial government still provided the broader 
framework which regulated the control over reserve land, although the colonial government allowed 
traditional leader to administer land according to the local land norms and cultural practices. Although 
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traditional leaders, chiefs and headmen, and are acquiring huge portions of rand in 
excess of 250 hectares at the expense of the local people. Government will not allow 
this abuse to be perpetrated by a few at the expense of other innocent Zambian (Minister 
of Lands 2013). 
The allegations of flouting the existing law provides strong grounds for proposing to review and reform 
the administration of customary land by traditional leaders. The proposed reforms are then expected to 
close the loopholes in the system so that traditional leaders do not have the chance to exploit local 
residents and abuse their powers in the course of administering customary land. We see here the state 
asserting its powers over the governance of customary land by appealing to the law. The state is also 
appealing to its responsibility to promote the general welfare of the people, and protect the poor from 
exploitation. As we shall see later, traditional leaders also claim that they are acting in the interest of 
their people, protecting their culture and identity.  
In addition to these, the state has also alleged that traditional authorities are not transparent and 
accountable in the way they administer customary land. To improve transparency and accountability in 
the administration of customary land, the state has proposed to establish statutory bodies at the district 
and chiefdom levels to take over the responsibilities of land administration. The other argument that 
state has presented to support its move to reform the administration of customary land is that the state 
wants to ‘open up’ rural areas to development by promoting the flow of investments. According to state 
officials, this is in line with the government policy of poverty reduction through investments. The 
argument is that if the administration of customary land is not reformed it would be difficult to attract 
investment into rural areas because the land rights are not registered and therefore insecure. The 
Zambian government has, since the adoption of liberal economy policy in 1991 when the Movement for 
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) came to power in 1991, been advocating for measure aimed at ‘opening 
up the country-side’ to investment (Mudenda 2006, FSRP 2010). It is believed that the only way to ‘open 
up’ the country side is to reform the administration of customary land so that it can create more secure 
rights in land for long term investments. 
Related to this argument is the idea that customary land is not efficiently used. According to the 
Zambian government, Zambia has a lot of under-utilised land, primarily in customary areas, and the 
argument has been that to promote efficient use of the land, it is necessary to reform the way customary 
land is administered (ZDA 2011). The state has also argued that customary land, as it is governed now, 
does not adhere to modern principles of land conservation, mainly due to ‘lack of land use controls’ and 
the associated overuse and degradation (GRZ 2015:16). The state has also argued that customary 
settlements occur in a spontaneous and disorderly manner making it difficult to plan land use properly. 
To overcome these problems, the state has proposed to reform customary land administration and 
management structures, with the objective of promoting secure access to land and equitable share of 
land resources in rural areas. 
4.  Contest for the control of customary land in Zambia
There are several contestations around the control of customary land, but in this paper focus is on the 
contest between the state and traditional leaders. Like in any other contest, the two sides to the contest 
present different views, interpretation of rules and arguments to support their position. The state for 
instance has presented several arguments to justify its proposal to reform the administration of 
customary land in Zambia. While the state acknowledges that customary leaders have been effective in 
ensuring access to land for the local residents, it has argued that these land ‘rights are never registered, 
although their recognition is guaranteed.’ The lack of registration of the land is one of the reasons given 
to support the proposed reform of customary land administration and governance (ibid).  
The state has also argued that some traditional leaders are abusing their powers over customary land 
and are alienating large pieces of land to foreign investors at the expense of the local residents. The 
former Minister of Lands in a press statement argued that, 
…while it is true that there are a number of chiefdoms that have been working closely 
with the Government in looking into the best interests of their subjects, and Government 
is grateful for that cooperation and support from these chiefdoms, it is equally true that 
there are certain cases in which our people have been exploited by practices that are 
inconsistent with the law (Minister of Lands 2013). 
The state’s argument has been that not all traditional leaders are abusing their powers to administer 
customary land, but there are some who are misusing their powers by selling customary land to 
foreigners and urban elites. To support his argument, the minister went on to state that, 
…my office is overwhelmed with cases of Zambians who are complaining of being 
displaced from their ancestral and family lands in preference for investors and the urban 
elite at the expense of vulnerable communities including women, youths and differently 
abled persons. This is against the pro-poor policy of the PF Government which seeks to 
promote the welfare of all vulnerable groups (ibid). 
It is interesting here to note that as a way of validating the legitimacy of the proposed reforms, the state 
is positioning itself as the protector of the poor people being exploited by the greedy traditional leaders. 
In doing this, the state is creating reasonable grounds for intervening in the administration of customary 
land. In order to support the state’s position, the minister appeals not only to the fact that traditional 
leaders are exploiting the poor, but also that they are acting against the law. Circular No. 1 of 1985, is 
cited as the law which is being flouted by traditional leaders, which states that the local authorities are 
not allowed to alienate customary land to leasehold in excess of 250 hectares (GRZ 1985:3).  
This is one area where there has been abuse in some parts of the country by a few greedy 
leaders where foreigners and in some cases rich Zambians are secretly approaching 
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does not adhere to modern principles of land conservation, mainly due to ‘lack of land use controls’ and 
the associated overuse and degradation (GRZ 2015:16). The state has also argued that customary 
settlements occur in a spontaneous and disorderly manner making it difficult to plan land use properly. 
To overcome these problems, the state has proposed to reform customary land administration and 
management structures, with the objective of promoting secure access to land and equitable share of 
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There are several contestations around the control of customary land, but in this paper focus is on the 
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…while it is true that there are a number of chiefdoms that have been working closely 
with the Government in looking into the best interests of their subjects, and Government 
is grateful for that cooperation and support from these chiefdoms, it is equally true that 
there are certain cases in which our people have been exploited by practices that are 
inconsistent with the law (Minister of Lands 2013). 
The state’s argument has been that not all traditional leaders are abusing their powers to administer 
customary land, but there are some who are misusing their powers by selling customary land to 
foreigners and urban elites. To support his argument, the minister went on to state that, 
…my office is overwhelmed with cases of Zambians who are complaining of being 
displaced from their ancestral and family lands in preference for investors and the urban 
elite at the expense of vulnerable communities including women, youths and differently 
abled persons. This is against the pro-poor policy of the PF Government which seeks to 
promote the welfare of all vulnerable groups (ibid). 
It is interesting here to note that as a way of validating the legitimacy of the proposed reforms, the state 
is positioning itself as the protector of the poor people being exploited by the greedy traditional leaders. 
In doing this, the state is creating reasonable grounds for intervening in the administration of customary 
land. In order to support the state’s position, the minister appeals not only to the fact that traditional 
leaders are exploiting the poor, but also that they are acting against the law. Circular No. 1 of 1985, is 
cited as the law which is being flouted by traditional leaders, which states that the local authorities are 
not allowed to alienate customary land to leasehold in excess of 250 hectares (GRZ 1985:3).  
This is one area where there has been abuse in some parts of the country by a few greedy 
leaders where foreigners and in some cases rich Zambians are secretly approaching 
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loss of customary land without corresponding benefits to local communities. There is 
insecurity on customary tenure as some people are displaced from their land due to large 
scale land acquisitions without regard to their land rights. … to ensure tenure security, 
some chiefs are issuing documents to ascertain user rights and ownership of pieces of 
land by families. However, such documents are not currently recognized by government 
(ZLA 2008). 
Traditional leaders have also contested the idea of vesting all land in Zambia, including customary land, 
in the president. They have argued that vesting customary land in the president has rendered traditional 
leaders’ and local people’s rights to customary land highly tenuous by effectively giving the president 
the powers of eminent domain on customary land (Kanyanat 2014). They have in fact recommended 
that the vestment of land in the president should be removed from the draft land policy and replaced 
with the classification of land into different categories as envisioned in Section 254 of the Constitution 
(see Kapata 2018). Traditional leaders have accused the state of disregarding the cultural rights of 
Zambians by disrespecting the customary practices around land in rural areas. They have argued that the 
main problem with land in Zambia is not that traditional leaders are not willing to release land for 
development (Chizyuka et al. 2006), but the state has no capacity to administer land in Zambia without 
the traditional leaders. 
In responding to the traditional leaders’ walk out of the validation meeting, the Minister of Lands 
was at pains to explain the new policy and how it has not abolished the institutions of chieftaincy and 
the traditional leaders’ responsibility to administer customary land. Not surprisingly, the Minister, 
instead of involking the ‘monopoly of violence’ of the state and dismiss the claims and the protest of the 
traditional leaders, addopts a mollifying approach, saying that the Ministry ‘shall continue to seek
opportunities to engage with the Traditional Leaders who are key stakeholders to the process. 
Clarification on the specific issues brought up by the Traditional Leaders at the National Validation 
Meeting shall be communicated in writing through the office of the Clerk of the House of Chiefs’ 
(Kapata 2018:5).  
4.2.  The state-traditional leaders contest 
As it may be evident by now, at the heart of the contest between the state and traditional leader in Zambia 
is the bid to control customary land. A glance at how the contest has played out suggest that traditional 
leaders are a force to be reckoned with; that they are not being side-lined. When they walked out of the 
Draft Policy validation meeting, an outsider may say the state should still go ahead and validate the 
policy without the traditional leaders. After all, the state has received the mandate from the people of 
Zambia to govern the country including the land, while the traditional leaders are actually unelected 
rulers. The reality however points to the inadequacy in the monolithic conception of the power of the 
state as expressed in the notions of states as having a monopoly of power though violence or war (Tilly 
1990). What the contest examined in this paper highlights is the view that power is never absolute, and 
this is clearly evident here. The powers of the state with regard to the governance of customary land 
4.1.  Traditional leaders’ response to the proposed land reforms
While traditional leaders are not contesting the proposed reforms, they are particularly opposing the 
proposed structures and rules for administering customary land. At the National Land Validation 
Meeting held on March 28, 2018, the 22 representatives of the 288 chiefs in Zambia stormed out of the 
meeting stating that they reject the proposed land policy. The chairperson of the House of Chiefs (which 
is a statutory body established to deal with matters related to traditional governance) argued that they 
decided to reject the proposed Draft Land Policy because ‘there is no mention of Chiefs in the draft 
policy document, thereby implying that the institution of Chieftaincy was being abolished’ (see Kapata 
2018: 2). It was also alleged that the concerns raised by traditional leaders in the earlier draft were not 
taken into account in the revised draft. Traditional leaders are also contesting the fact that only 22 out 
of 288 chiefs were invited to the validation meeting.
Aside from the procedural issues relating to chiefs being consulted over the draft land policy and the 
number of chiefs invited to the National Validation Meeting, the substantive contestation is around the 
control over customary land. Traditional leaders are very much aware that customary land is rapidly 
disappearing as a result of converting customary land into state land, and they are interpreting this as 
something that threaten their existence. Although some chiefs have been reported to be ‘selling’ 
customary land to foreign investors and rich Zambians, there are many who are realising that when 
customary land is depleted they will have no source of power, and this is why they are contesting the 
move by the state to divest the administration of customary land from traditional leaders to statutory 
bodies.  
Although there has been no systematic response to the problems associated with the way customary 
land is managed cited by the state, traditional leaders have argued that customary land belongs to them. 
They say that they defended the land against colonial invasion, and will defend against anyone who 
attempts to take the land away from them. They argue that they have inherited the land from their 
ancestors and vow to keep it for generations to come. Thus, traditional leaders are not just looking on; 
they are trying to find ways to contest the state by appealing to tradition and culture as a response to 
what they are interpreting as threats to their existence. For instance one paramount chief, in an effort to 
mobilise his fellow chiefs to reject the state’s proposal to take away the role of administering customary 
land from traditional authorities, sent out a petition to all the 287 chiefs in Zambia asking them to sign 
it as proof that they are against the proposed reforms (see Kanyanta 2014).  
Traditional Leaders have also opposed the policy of converting customary land into leasehold tenure; 
they have argued that it should be possible to give some form of certificate or title without converting 
the land to state land. This was articulated in a communique issued by a group of Traditional Leaders 
from different part of Zambia who bemoaned the loss of customary land, and urged the Zambian 
government to recognise the documents being issued by traditional leaders on customary land. The noted 
that,
Once land is converted from customary tenure to leasehold the land does not revert to 
customary tenure at the expiry or cancellation of the lease. This means that there is a net 
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(see Kapata 2018). Traditional leaders have accused the state of disregarding the cultural rights of 
Zambians by disrespecting the customary practices around land in rural areas. They have argued that the 
main problem with land in Zambia is not that traditional leaders are not willing to release land for 
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the traditional leaders. 
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instead of involking the ‘monopoly of violence’ of the state and dismiss the claims and the protest of the 
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Clarification on the specific issues brought up by the Traditional Leaders at the National Validation 
Meeting shall be communicated in writing through the office of the Clerk of the House of Chiefs’ 
(Kapata 2018:5).  
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As it may be evident by now, at the heart of the contest between the state and traditional leader in Zambia 
is the bid to control customary land. A glance at how the contest has played out suggest that traditional 
leaders are a force to be reckoned with; that they are not being side-lined. When they walked out of the 
Draft Policy validation meeting, an outsider may say the state should still go ahead and validate the 
policy without the traditional leaders. After all, the state has received the mandate from the people of 
Zambia to govern the country including the land, while the traditional leaders are actually unelected 
rulers. The reality however points to the inadequacy in the monolithic conception of the power of the 
state as expressed in the notions of states as having a monopoly of power though violence or war (Tilly 
1990). What the contest examined in this paper highlights is the view that power is never absolute, and 
this is clearly evident here. The powers of the state with regard to the governance of customary land 
4.1.  Traditional leaders’ response to the proposed land reforms
While traditional leaders are not contesting the proposed reforms, they are particularly opposing the 
proposed structures and rules for administering customary land. At the National Land Validation 
Meeting held on March 28, 2018, the 22 representatives of the 288 chiefs in Zambia stormed out of the 
meeting stating that they reject the proposed land policy. The chairperson of the House of Chiefs (which 
is a statutory body established to deal with matters related to traditional governance) argued that they 
decided to reject the proposed Draft Land Policy because ‘there is no mention of Chiefs in the draft 
policy document, thereby implying that the institution of Chieftaincy was being abolished’ (see Kapata 
2018: 2). It was also alleged that the concerns raised by traditional leaders in the earlier draft were not 
taken into account in the revised draft. Traditional leaders are also contesting the fact that only 22 out 
of 288 chiefs were invited to the validation meeting.
Aside from the procedural issues relating to chiefs being consulted over the draft land policy and the 
number of chiefs invited to the National Validation Meeting, the substantive contestation is around the 
control over customary land. Traditional leaders are very much aware that customary land is rapidly 
disappearing as a result of converting customary land into state land, and they are interpreting this as 
something that threaten their existence. Although some chiefs have been reported to be ‘selling’ 
customary land to foreign investors and rich Zambians, there are many who are realising that when 
customary land is depleted they will have no source of power, and this is why they are contesting the 
move by the state to divest the administration of customary land from traditional leaders to statutory 
bodies.  
Although there has been no systematic response to the problems associated with the way customary 
land is managed cited by the state, traditional leaders have argued that customary land belongs to them. 
They say that they defended the land against colonial invasion, and will defend against anyone who 
attempts to take the land away from them. They argue that they have inherited the land from their 
ancestors and vow to keep it for generations to come. Thus, traditional leaders are not just looking on; 
they are trying to find ways to contest the state by appealing to tradition and culture as a response to 
what they are interpreting as threats to their existence. For instance one paramount chief, in an effort to 
mobilise his fellow chiefs to reject the state’s proposal to take away the role of administering customary 
land from traditional authorities, sent out a petition to all the 287 chiefs in Zambia asking them to sign 
it as proof that they are against the proposed reforms (see Kanyanta 2014).  
Traditional Leaders have also opposed the policy of converting customary land into leasehold tenure; 
they have argued that it should be possible to give some form of certificate or title without converting 
the land to state land. This was articulated in a communique issued by a group of Traditional Leaders 
from different part of Zambia who bemoaned the loss of customary land, and urged the Zambian 
government to recognise the documents being issued by traditional leaders on customary land. The noted 
that,
Once land is converted from customary tenure to leasehold the land does not revert to 
customary tenure at the expiry or cancellation of the lease. This means that there is a net 
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its power to govern, but a game of seeking and forging alliances. 
In this regard, the real power of traditional leaders come from the people’s perception trust in the 
institution of traditional leaders to administer land. In a study in Zambia, local residents were asked 
whether they would prefer the state or the traditional leaders to administer customary land, and majority 
of the respondents indicated that they would prefer customary land to be left in the hands of traditional 
leaders and this is the reason they gave: ‘customary land is better because… even people without money 
are getting customary land, but if the land is under the state it means that everyone will have to buy land, 
and those without money will not have land’ (LURLAP FGD 2014). Baldwin (2011) in a survey of more 
than 19 African countries, including Zambia, found that majority of the people believe that traditional 
leaders should have the primary responsibility to administer customary land. It seems that traditional 
leaders enjoy a lot of support from the local community when it comes to matters of customary land. 
This is despite reports that some of the traditional leaders are involved in the alienation of customary 
land. For example in Zambia, there have been several stories especially in the print media reporting that 
an increasing number of traditional leaders are involved in the selling of customary land to foreign 
investors who offer them huge sums of moany which they pocket.  
One example is an article in the Pots Newspaper of Monday, 10 January 2011, which claims that 
many chiefs have become corrupt and selfish. But still people trust these leaders and many would like 
these leaders to continue administering customary land. Part of this trust is rooted in the belief that 
customary land belongs to the chief. In a study in Zambia, when residents were asked about who owns 
land, there was an overwhelming response and validation of the view that chiefs are the owners of the 
land. In one chiefdom, when we asked residents about what would happen to the people who have 
managed to get tittle deeds on customary land if they do not corporate with the chief, residents believe 
that the chief has the power to cancel the title deed if the title holder is no cooperating (LURLAP 2014).
Such beliefs have given the chiefs a lot of support from the local population even when they are actually 
abusing their authority as reported in the media and the government. Control over land is critical and 
this is why traditional leaders are contesting the proposal to take away this responsibility from them. 
4.4.  Land vestment
The other central issue related to the administration of customary land is the idea of vesting all land in 
Zambia in the president. The new Draft Land Policy has maintained the provision that all land in Zambia 
is vested in the president who holds it in trust on behalf of the Zambian people. While the New draft 
policy has acknowledged that the ‘vestment of land in the President is one of contentious clauses in the 
post-multiparty democratic dispensation’ (GRZ 2015:15), it does not regard the issue of customary land 
as a problem in this case. It is only mentions the concern that vesting land in the president leads to 
political interference in the management of land. But for traditional leaders, as noted earlier, their main 
contention is that vesting all land including customary land in the president amounts to the failure to 
recognise the rights of local people to control customary land. They argue that this has led to a great 
deal of confusion when it comes to customary land. Certainly, the issue of vestment has been problematic 
to the point of being ambiguous in both policy and law. For example, while section 7 (subsection 1) of 
appears to be checked by traditional leaders. One may wonder where did the traditional leaders get such 
powers when they have nor army, they do not control the courts or guns? Baldwin (2011) finds it 
puzzling that in agrarian societies where land carries so much weight, the politicians would cede the 
power to control and allocate land to traditional authorities who are not part of the bureaucratic state 
system. It is terrefore interesting to examine what is happening in this case, particularly the source of 
the power the traditional authorities seem to wield.
4.3.  Traditional leaders’ power base 
The power of traditional leaders in Africa derives from a complex mixture of traditional and the precepts 
of modern democracy. During the early days of independence, there was a widespread view that the 
post-colonial African states would wipe away the corrupted forms of traditional governance structures 
and replace them with centralised monolithic, bureaucratic institutions based on constitutional and 
statutory rule (Baldwin 2011, Nuesri 2014). But to the contrary, the importance and power of traditional 
leaders in Africa is actually being revived (see UNECA 2007, Nuesri 2014). In Zambia it has been 
observed that, ‘Anyone who has intensively and over an extended period of time participated in post-
independence Zambian society, cannot help to be aware of the great importance still attached to chiefs. 
Nor is this importance limited to rural districts outside the line of rail’ (Binsbergen 1987:140). Even in 
countries which have tried to ban or discredit traditional forms of governance, these leaders have 
continued to survive and command a lot of influence in society and national politics (Baldwin 2011). 
We see this in Zambia where the state does not take a confrontational approach with chiefs when they 
protest and reject the draft and policy. Instead the state seeks to engage with the traditional leaders, 
treading carefully not to roughen their shoulders. 
The debate on the state and traditional leaders in Africa has been raging for some time now. While 
some analysts have argued that traditional leaders because they are not elected leaders, their exercise of
power over critical resources such as land compromise the values and principles of democracy (see 
Ntsebeza 2006), others have argued that institutions of traditional leadership are important and 
compatible with the principles of democracy and the doctrines of modern statehood (Logan 2008). To 
understand the seemingly puzzling situation, one has to turn to the structure and practice of democratic 
politics in Africa. If we look at the composition of the electorate in Africa, majority of voters (roughly 
65 percent) are actually in rural areas under or with strong trust in traditional leaders. Thus, for 
politicians who seek to win elections in Africa, they cannot afford to antagonise the rural vote. 
The traditional leaders’ influence over rural residents is strongly tied to the cultural beliefs, collective 
identity, which in turn are connected to the chiefs control over customary land. It is in this sense that 
land resources are critical not just as a means of production but also a source of power, and traditional 
leaders know this pretty well, just as politicians and state officials do. Politicians across Africa tread this 
path equivocally, sometimes forging alliances with traditional leaders while at other times threatening 
to discipline them (see Herbst 2000, Baldwin 2011). This seemingly contradictory behaviour by the state 
is actually a perfectly rational behaviour on the part of politicians (Chitonge 2018). This is why the 
contest over customary land administration in Zambia is not a straight forward case of the state showing 
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its power to govern, but a game of seeking and forging alliances. 
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of the respondents indicated that they would prefer customary land to be left in the hands of traditional 
leaders and this is the reason they gave: ‘customary land is better because… even people without money 
are getting customary land, but if the land is under the state it means that everyone will have to buy land, 
and those without money will not have land’ (LURLAP FGD 2014). Baldwin (2011) in a survey of more 
than 19 African countries, including Zambia, found that majority of the people believe that traditional 
leaders should have the primary responsibility to administer customary land. It seems that traditional 
leaders enjoy a lot of support from the local community when it comes to matters of customary land. 
This is despite reports that some of the traditional leaders are involved in the alienation of customary 
land. For example in Zambia, there have been several stories especially in the print media reporting that 
an increasing number of traditional leaders are involved in the selling of customary land to foreign 
investors who offer them huge sums of moany which they pocket.  
One example is an article in the Pots Newspaper of Monday, 10 January 2011, which claims that 
many chiefs have become corrupt and selfish. But still people trust these leaders and many would like 
these leaders to continue administering customary land. Part of this trust is rooted in the belief that 
customary land belongs to the chief. In a study in Zambia, when residents were asked about who owns 
land, there was an overwhelming response and validation of the view that chiefs are the owners of the 
land. In one chiefdom, when we asked residents about what would happen to the people who have 
managed to get tittle deeds on customary land if they do not corporate with the chief, residents believe 
that the chief has the power to cancel the title deed if the title holder is no cooperating (LURLAP 2014).
Such beliefs have given the chiefs a lot of support from the local population even when they are actually 
abusing their authority as reported in the media and the government. Control over land is critical and 
this is why traditional leaders are contesting the proposal to take away this responsibility from them. 
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The other central issue related to the administration of customary land is the idea of vesting all land in 
Zambia in the president. The new Draft Land Policy has maintained the provision that all land in Zambia 
is vested in the president who holds it in trust on behalf of the Zambian people. While the New draft 
policy has acknowledged that the ‘vestment of land in the President is one of contentious clauses in the 
post-multiparty democratic dispensation’ (GRZ 2015:15), it does not regard the issue of customary land 
as a problem in this case. It is only mentions the concern that vesting land in the president leads to 
political interference in the management of land. But for traditional leaders, as noted earlier, their main 
contention is that vesting all land including customary land in the president amounts to the failure to 
recognise the rights of local people to control customary land. They argue that this has led to a great 
deal of confusion when it comes to customary land. Certainly, the issue of vestment has been problematic 
to the point of being ambiguous in both policy and law. For example, while section 7 (subsection 1) of 
appears to be checked by traditional leaders. One may wonder where did the traditional leaders get such 
powers when they have nor army, they do not control the courts or guns? Baldwin (2011) finds it 
puzzling that in agrarian societies where land carries so much weight, the politicians would cede the 
power to control and allocate land to traditional authorities who are not part of the bureaucratic state 
system. It is terrefore interesting to examine what is happening in this case, particularly the source of 
the power the traditional authorities seem to wield.
4.3.  Traditional leaders’ power base 
The power of traditional leaders in Africa derives from a complex mixture of traditional and the precepts 
of modern democracy. During the early days of independence, there was a widespread view that the 
post-colonial African states would wipe away the corrupted forms of traditional governance structures 
and replace them with centralised monolithic, bureaucratic institutions based on constitutional and 
statutory rule (Baldwin 2011, Nuesri 2014). But to the contrary, the importance and power of traditional 
leaders in Africa is actually being revived (see UNECA 2007, Nuesri 2014). In Zambia it has been 
observed that, ‘Anyone who has intensively and over an extended period of time participated in post-
independence Zambian society, cannot help to be aware of the great importance still attached to chiefs. 
Nor is this importance limited to rural districts outside the line of rail’ (Binsbergen 1987:140). Even in 
countries which have tried to ban or discredit traditional forms of governance, these leaders have 
continued to survive and command a lot of influence in society and national politics (Baldwin 2011). 
We see this in Zambia where the state does not take a confrontational approach with chiefs when they 
protest and reject the draft and policy. Instead the state seeks to engage with the traditional leaders, 
treading carefully not to roughen their shoulders. 
The debate on the state and traditional leaders in Africa has been raging for some time now. While 
some analysts have argued that traditional leaders because they are not elected leaders, their exercise of
power over critical resources such as land compromise the values and principles of democracy (see 
Ntsebeza 2006), others have argued that institutions of traditional leadership are important and 
compatible with the principles of democracy and the doctrines of modern statehood (Logan 2008). To 
understand the seemingly puzzling situation, one has to turn to the structure and practice of democratic 
politics in Africa. If we look at the composition of the electorate in Africa, majority of voters (roughly 
65 percent) are actually in rural areas under or with strong trust in traditional leaders. Thus, for 
politicians who seek to win elections in Africa, they cannot afford to antagonise the rural vote. 
The traditional leaders’ influence over rural residents is strongly tied to the cultural beliefs, collective 
identity, which in turn are connected to the chiefs control over customary land. It is in this sense that 
land resources are critical not just as a means of production but also a source of power, and traditional 
leaders know this pretty well, just as politicians and state officials do. Politicians across Africa tread this 
path equivocally, sometimes forging alliances with traditional leaders while at other times threatening 
to discipline them (see Herbst 2000, Baldwin 2011). This seemingly contradictory behaviour by the state 
is actually a perfectly rational behaviour on the part of politicians (Chitonge 2018). This is why the 
contest over customary land administration in Zambia is not a straight forward case of the state showing 
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the 1995 Lands Act recognises customary land and defends the vesting of customary land in traditional 
leaders, Section (1) that vests all land in the head of state (republican president), clearly undermines the 
same rights recognised for traditional authorities. If all land in Zambia is vested in the president, a second 
vesting of the same land in customary authorities only leads to ambivalence and confusion. Although 
there have been a view that traditional leaders are not vested with the land but are only given the 
responsibility to administer customary land by the president, this is not the interpretation and 
understanding held by traditional leaders. They always see themselves as custodians of customary land 
in their respective communities, and the often act accordingly. The contest the fore is partly created by 
this ambiguity regarding customary land. When one looks at the broader political and economic context 
to the 1995 Lands Act in Zambia, it is evident that the MMD government’s intension was clearly to do 
away with customary land, and this is at the moment the heart of the contest, though the Draft Policy 
seeks to appease traditional leaders by assuring them that the state is not trying to take away their 
responsibility to administer customary land. 
5.  Conclusion
This paper has examined the intensifying contest over the control of customary land in Africa, drawing 
from the Zambian case. The paper has shown that the contending parties present different views and 
understanding of governance of customary land. The state argues that the current way customary land 
is administered lacks transparency, accountability, efficient planning, efficient use and security, and that 
this make customary land prone to abuse by traditional authorities. The state is using these concerns as 
justification for reforming customary land administration and structures, proposing to replace the current 
structure with statutory bodies which are expected to be more transparent and accountable to the people. 
Traditional leaders on the other hand are protesting against these proposed reforms and have rejected 
the draft land policy arguing that its intention is to abolish the institution of traditional leadership. At the 
centre of this contestation, it is argued in this paper is the quest for control of customary land, with both 
parties well aware that control of land confers power and influence. We see in this case that traditional 
leaders have power to hold the state in check. While it is puzzling that the state has ceded the power to 
control one of the most important natural resources land, the dynamics nature of democratic politics in 
Africa make this perfectly sensible if seen from that angle. The influence demonstrated by traditional 
leader in the case of Zambia does not lie only in the cultural and ethnic allegiance, but also in the control 
over land and the rural vote. 
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